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Abstract 
The question of energy security of the European Union (EU) has come high on the 
European political agenda since the mid-2000s as developments in the international 
energy sector have increasingly been perceived as a threat by the EU institutions 
and by the Member  State governments. The externalisation of the EU’s internal 
energy market has in that context been presented as a means to ensure energy 
security. This approach, which can be called ‘post-modern’ with reference to Robert 
Cooper’s division of the world into different ‘ages’,1 however, shows insufficiencies in 
terms of energy security as a number of EU energy partners belonging to the 
‘modern’ world do not accept to play the same rules. This consequently poses the 
questions of the relevance of the market-based approach and of the need for 
alternative solutions. This paper therefore argues that the market-based approach, 
based on the liberalisation of the European energy market, needs to be comple-
mented by a geopolitical approach to ensure the security of the EU’s energy 
supplies. Such a geopolitical approach, however, still faces important challenges.   
 
   
                                                 
1 Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations, London, Atlantic Books, 2003. Raphaël Metais 
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Introduction 
European energy policy, although it has been at the core of European integration 
with the 1951 Treaty of Paris creating the European Coal and Steel Community 
(which expired in 2002) and the 1957 Rome Treaty establishing Euratom, has not yet 
become a truly integrated policy. In  the 1980s, energy policy started to be 
addressed from a liberalisation perspective in pursuit of the European Commission’s 
will to complete the European internal market. Since then, internal energy market 
liberalisation  has continuously been presented by EU officials as the main tool to 
address European energy security concerns, including the security of supply.  
The gas crises between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 taught the EU that the 
traditional economic approach had reached its limits and that new policies in the 
energy sector were urgently needed. This challenge has been acknowledged at the 
EU level,  as  demonstrated by the 2006 Green Paper of the Commission,  which 
recognises the importance of “speaking with the same voice”2 at the international 
level. Three years later, the security of energy supply was introduced in the EU treaty 
following the Lisbon revision, thus giving a legal basis for future developments in this 
policy field.3 
The current situation of Europe’s energy security can be interpreted through Robert 
Cooper’s framework of different ‘ages’ in the international system.4 He claims that 
Europe, a ‘post-modern’ political entity which has internally abandoned the 
‘traditional’  methods of international relations  based on the Westphalian system 
between nations, faces a profound difficulty when it has to deal with international 
partners from the ‘modern’ world. In order to solve this difficulty, he calls for the 
development of a double-standard approach. On the one hand, the EU should, with 
partners accepting the ‘post-modern’ rules,  use tools such as a transparent 
regulatory framework and open multilateralism. On the other hand, the EU should be 
able to resort to classical power-based instruments  such as pressure, threat and 
sanctions to effectively defend its interests when engaging with ‘modern’ partners. 
Against this background, this paper tries to answer the following questions: First, to 
what extent does the liberalisation of the EU’s internal energy market contribute to 
                                                 
2 European Commission, “A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure 
Energy”, Green Paper, European Commission, COM(2006) 105 final, Brussels, 8.3.2006, p. 14.  
3 Art. 194.1(b) TFEU 
4 Cooper, op.cit. EU Diplomacy Papers 3/2013 
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Europe’s energy security?  Second, what other policy options besides the market-
based approach does the EU have to secure its energy supplies?  
This analysis has to be seen against the background of the recent changes in the 
structure of international energy markets. Up to now, three periods in the energy 
producer-consumer relationship can roughly be distinguished.5 The first period which 
started with the first oil discoveries in the late 19th century was characterised by the 
domination of (notably Western) international oil companies over energy resources 
and lasted approximately until the 1970s. The second period embodied a greater 
control of energy-producing countries over their resources,  as reflected by the 
creation of OPEC in 1960 and the oil embargo in 1973. The third, still on-going phase 
started with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the spread of liberal values such as 
democracy and market economy and the empowerment  of liberal international 
institutions. The liberalisation of the energy sector, particularly in the EU, entails that 
energy has increasingly  become subject to the logic of free markets.  These  last 
years, however, producing countries have increasingly resorted to political consider-
ation in the management of energy.  
The paper is structured in six parts. First,  the place of Europe in the international 
energy system is presented. Second, the paper analyses the complex notion of 
energy security. The third part applies the concepts of modernity and post-modernity 
to the energy sector. The fourth and fifth parts analyse the EU’s market liberalisation 
paradigm and its relevance as a tool for the EU’s external security of supply policy. 
Finally, the sixth part presents the challenges of a reinvigorated EU energy policy in 
the face of changing energy markets.  
 
Europe in the international energy system 
Energy is of utmost importance as most modern activity relies on it. An important 
challenge in that respect is the possible depletion of natural resources. Indeed, 
future scenarios by the International Energy Agency predict that the global demand 
for primary energy sources will increase by 36% between 2008 and 2035 “with fossil 
fuels accounting for over one-half of the increase in total primary energy demand”.6 
                                                 
5 Kirsten Westphal, “Energy Policy between Multilateral Governance and Geopolitics: Whither 
Europe ?”, Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, no. 4, 2006, p. 47. 
6 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2010, Paris, OECD/IEA, 2010, Executive 
Summary, pp. 46-47.  Raphaël Metais 
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In the EU alone, gas demand is set to increase by 24% between 2005 and 2025.7 This 
can  partly  be explained by international policy commitments to reduce CO2 
emissions, given the favourable attributes of natural gas in relation to environmental 
concerns, but also by its practical ability to substitute for other fuels in the generation 
of electricity power.8 Moreover, the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant 
caused by the earthquake and the tsunami in 2011 is likely to contribute to an 
increased demand for gas in the EU as sceptics of nuclear energy will push for a 
switch to gas-powered plants.9 However, even though there will be a tendency to 
switch  to other energy sources in all sectors for environmental and economic 
reasons, oil will remain the dominant fossil fuel in the world primary energy mix until 
2035.10 
Europe’s need  of oil  is  mainly driven by the transport sector where hardly any 
substitution is possible. In 2009, Europe’s own oil production (mainly in Norway and 
the United Kingdom) covers about 14% of its consumption; the rest is imported from 
Russia (around one third), Saudi Arabia (9%), Libya (8%) and Iran (5%).11 However, 
dependency rates vary in terms of both source and level among EU Member States. 
For instance, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Lithuania are almost entirely depended 
on Russian imports.12  
Concerning natural gas, the EU’s security challenges are different as the gas market 
presents specific features. Gas is mainly transported through fixed pipelines, which 
creates direct, long-term interdependence between the producer and the buyer. 
Consequently, there is no global gas market but rather regional markets, even 
though the development of liquefied natural gas (LNG) may change the situation in 
the future.13 The EU’s indigenous gas production peaked in 1996 and started to 
decline, whereas its consumption grew and still continues to increase.14 The two main 
EU gas providers are Russia and Algeria, but potential substantial supplies from Africa, 
                                                 
7 Arianna Checchi, Arno Behrens and Christian Egenhofer, “Long-Term Energy Security Risks 
for Europe: A Sector-Specific Approach”, CEPS Working Document, no. 309, Brussels, 2009, p. 
14.  
8 International Energy Agency, op.cit., p. 50.  
9 “Turkey caught between Nabucco and South Stream”, EurActiv, 2011. 
10 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2010 Factsheet, What does the global 
energy outlook to 2035 look like?, Paris, OECD/IEA, 2010, p. 1.  
11 Checchi, Behrens and Egenhofer, op.cit., p. 7.  
12 Ibid.  
13 Checchi, Behrens and Egenhofer, op.cit., p. 14.  
14 Ibid., p. 15.  EU Diplomacy Papers 3/2013 
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the Middle East, or the Caspian region, imported either as LNG (Nigeria, Middle East) 
or by pipeline, are seen as important diversification options. 
The two tables below illustrate the uneven distribution of fossil resources worldwide. 
The figures underline Europe’s worrying situation as they display an important gap 
between Europe’s oil and gas production and consumption.  
Table 1: World oil reserves, production and consumption (2008)  
World share (%)  USA  EU  Japan  China  Russia  Middle East  Sum 
Oil reserves  2.4  0.5  0  1.2  6.3  59.9  70.3 
Oil production  7.8  2.7  0  4.8  12.4  31.9  59.6 
Oil consumption  20.9  22.3  6.4  11.4  3.2  3.9  68.1 
Source:  Gunnar Fermann, “Introduction: Dynamic Frontiers of Energy Security”, in Gunnar 
Fermann (ed.), Political Economy of Energy in Europe, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, Berlin, 
2009, p. 20. 
Table 2: World gas reserves, production and consumption (2008) 
World share (%)  USA  EU  Japan  China  Russia  Iran  Qatar  Sum 
Gas reserves  3.6  1.6  0  1.3  23.4  16.  13.8  59.7 
Gas production  19.3  6.2  0  2.5  19.6  3.8  2.5  53.9 
Gas consumption  22  16.2  3.1  2.8  13.9  3.9  0.7  62.6 
Source: Ibid., p. 21. 
The basic principles of an operational definition of energy security are the “stable, 
uninterrupted supplies at affordable prices”.15 However, drawing on the institutional 
literature on energy security,16 different aspects can be put forward: the need to 
ensure required investments, the reliability of exporters,  or  risks linked to transit 
countries and technical facilities, which can lead to short-term disruptions. This latter 
element is probably the most referred to when speaking about energy security in 
Europe after the 2006 and 2009 gas transit crises between Russia and Ukraine which 
had dramatic consequences on certain EU Member States. Interestingly, the energy 
                                                 
15 Oystein Noreng, “Energy Security for Europe: A choice of Suppliers and Partners”, in Gunnar 
Fermann (ed.), Political Economy of Energy in Europe, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, Berlin, 
2009, p. 221.  
16 See for instance Thomas Legge and Christian Egenhofer, “Security of Energy Supply: A 
Question for Policy or the Markets?”, Report of a CEPS Working Party, Centre for European 
Policy Studies, Brussels, 2001, p. 4.  Raphaël Metais 
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market itself, which is presented as a solution to energy security concerns, can also 
be part of the risk if its structure turns out to be unfavourable to consumer countries. 
 
Energy security: a complex and multifaceted issue  
Energy security is a quite complex notion. Contrary to most of the  other  traded 
goods, it entails in itself a strategic dimension. Energy security can be tackled from 
two main perspectives: geopolitics and economics.   
The strategic dimension of energy security 
Energy is a strategic issue for two main reasons. On the one hand, energy can be 
considered as strategic because it is  at the core  of the way  of living of modern 
societies and has played a crucial role in their evolution. On the other hand, energy 
also becomes a security issue because it is undergoing a process of ‘securitisation’. 
The strategic dimension of energy seems to have become obvious when trends 
towards an increasing consumption of fossil fuels and thus a dependence on these 
energy sources started to be perceived as a challenge by the West.17 The 1973 oil 
crisis and the subsequent OPEC oil embargo put the economic models of several 
Western countries at risk and triggered strategic reflexions around energy supplies. 
Energy plays indeed a fundamental role for the smooth functioning of all economies 
but even more in the developed ones. Modern states rely on energy “to implement 
key political goals related to the economy at large”,18 which are directly or indirectly 
linked to almost every aspect of social life. To put it simply, modern life understood in 
broad economic, political and social terms would be impossible without a 
considerable amount of energy, particularly from fossil fuels. 
Given its central role in the economy, energy is closely linked to economic growth. It 
has been calculated, for instance, that for one percentage point of economic 
growth, primary energy19 consumption increases by 0.5 point.20 Considering the fact 
that development is based on economic growth, it is not surprising that energy has 
come to the forefront of political issues. Therefore, energy can be defined as a 
                                                 
17 Gunnar Fermann, “Introduction: Dynamic Frontiers of Energy Security”, in Gunnar Fermann 
(ed.), Political Economy of Energy in Europe, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, Berlin, 2009, p. 11.  
18 Ibid.  
19 Primary energy is defined as energy “embodied in natural resources prior to undergoing 
any human-made conversions or transformations”. See “Primary Energy”, The Encyclopedia 
of Earth, 2007. 
20 Liubou Yavid-Reviron,  Les relations énergétiques entre l’Union européenne et la Russie : 
Dépendance ou Interdépendance?, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2008, p. 13. EU Diplomacy Papers 3/2013 
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strategic resource, matching the relevant definition of “resources without which it is 
almost impossible to conceive socio-economic development within a particular 
historic era”.21 
Another way to analyse energy as a strategic resource relates to the theoretical 
proposals of ‘securitisation’ developed by the so-called  Copenhagen School: 
“Securitization is defined as a specific way of staging the issue on the political 
arena.”22 Such a ‘speech act’, whereby declarations and comments on energy 
security create a political reality and are followed by concrete political decisions,  is 
aimed at getting a specific political issue accepted as a security problem for society 
and at collecting sufficient support for this definition in order to allow defensive 
security moves.23 For example, at least  since 1974 and Nixon’s state of the Union 
address, US Presidents,  including Barack Obama,  have repeatedly presented US 
dependency on external oil imports as a major threat to US national security.24  
In the EU framework, a similar move towards securitisation of energy issues can be 
observed. As early as 1974, the Commission formulated the notion of ‘energy 
security’.25 The main threat identified was that “external actors don’t play the same 
game as the EU”.26 The European Parliament too adopted a securitised tone in the 
energy debate in the 1970s. In the Council, however, the issue was only seriously 
addressed in 2005 during the European Council meeting at Hampton Court where 
Member  States agreed to tackle important issues related to the internal energy 
market.27 Even though the three institutions have pushed in the same directions, they 
have done so and continue to do so with different arguments. In particular, they 
have not singled out the same ‘referent objects’, defined in securitisation theory as 
the elements “that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a 
                                                 
21 Silviu Negut, M.C. Neacsu and L. B. Vlad, “The Geopolitics of Strategic Energy Resources”, 
Strategic Impact, no. 1, 2007, p. 18, cited in Fermann, op.cit., p. 11.  
22 Jakub M. Godzimirski, “Energy Security and the Politics of Identity”, in Fermann (ed.), 
Political Economy of Energy in Europe, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, Berlin, 2009, p. 176.  
23 Ibid.  
24 “An Energy-Independent future”, The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, Comedy Partners, June 
28, 2000. 
25 Michal Natorski and Anna Herranz Surralés, “Securitizing Moves to Nowhere? The Framing of 
the European Union’s Energy Policy”, Journal of Contemporary European Research, vol. 4, no. 
2, 2008, p. 75.  
26 Ibid.  
27 Coby van der Linde, “External Energy Policy: Old Fears and New Dilemmas in a Larger 
Union”, in André Sapir (ed.), Fragmented Power: Europe and the Global Economy, 2007, p. 
273. Raphaël Metais 
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legitimate claim to survival”.28 The Commission’s analysis focused on competitiveness 
and the European integration process itself. 29 The European Parliament mainly 
focussed on the social dimension of energy policy,30 whereas the Member States in 
the Council concentrated on the linkage between “states’ energy interdependence 
and their autonomy in vital economic and political matters”.31 
Energy security and geopolitics 
Two main characteristics give fossil fuels a geopolitical dimension. They are highly 
concentrated in a few regions in the world and they are non-renewable. 80% of the 
world’s oil is located in nine countries representing only 5% of the world’s population, 
whereas 80% of the world’s gas resources are found in 13 countries.32 The Middle East 
alone possesses 62% of oil and 45% of proven gas reserves.33 
This situation has geopolitical implications from several perspectives. First, most of the 
fossil fuels are located in politically unstable regions. For instance, among the seven 
countries once designated by the EU as sponsoring international terrorism or being 
‘rogue states’, five are energy producers,34 three are major oil producers (Libya, Iran, 
and Iraq) and two possess together around 20% of the world’s proven oil reserves 
(Iran and Iraq).35 Second, problems with access to resources may stem from internal 
political developments in producing states. Venezuela, a member of OPEC and a 
major oil producer, has engaged in a nationalisation move after the re-election of 
Hugo Chavez in 2006, which threatened its supplies to international markets. Russia, 
which holds around 6% of the world’s oil and 23% of the world’s gas reserves,36 has 
since the election of Vladimir Putin as President in 2000 demonstrated “a growing 
ability and willingness to use energy as a political tool in order to pursue its political 
and geopolitical goals [...and] strengthen its international position”.37 This appears to 
be part of worldwide trends towards a re-nationalisation and politicisation of energy. 
                                                 
28 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security, A New Framework for Analysis, 
London, Lynne Rienner, 1998, p. 36.  
29 Natorski and Surralés, op.cit., p. 76.  
30 Ibid., p. 78. 
31 Ibid., p. 81.  
32  Benjamin L. Sovacool, “Introduction”, in Benjamin L. Sovacool (ed.), The Routledge 
Handbook of Energy Security, New York, Routledge, 2011, p. 21.  
33 Frank Umbach, “Global Energy Security and the Implications for the EU”, Energy Policy, no. 
38, 2010, p. 1233. 
34 Libya, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Sudan. 
35 Umbach, op.cit.  
36 Fermann, op.cit., pp. 20-21.  
37 Godzimirski, op.cit., p. 181.  EU Diplomacy Papers 3/2013 
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Whereas in the 1960s the ‘Seven Sisters’38 controlled over 85% of the world’s oil and 
gas reserves, the trend has reversed, and today the ‘new Seven Sisters’,39 the main 
national oil companies hold the majority of the resources.40 In this context, concerns 
stem from the fact that an increasing number of energy companies controlled by 
governments tends to overlook the basic logic of market forces in favour of wider 
political and ideological ambitions.41 At the same time, the reluctance of some 
energy-producing countries’ governments to accept foreign direct investments may 
further complicate the task of securing energy supplies for energy-importing 
countries.42 
The geopolitical framework of energy security based on the above-mentioned 
elements can adequately be analysed through the ‘Regions and Empire’ scenario 
developed by Aad Correljé and Coby van der Linde.43 The scenario foresees the 
future of energy security issues through a “division of the world into countries and 
regions, on the basis of ideology, religion and political arguments”. 44 The main 
underpinnings of this vision are the absence of effective international markets 
combined with highly integrated energy companies operating on a national basis. 
Foreign policy developments also tend to give credit to such a scenario. The division 
of the UN Security Council over the war in Iraq in 2003 is a telling example of different 
states or groups  of states having diverging interests in a conflict in which energy 
considerations were never absent. 
Energy security and economics 
Energy security analysed from an economic perspective puts the emphasis on the 
fact  that energy is a traded commodity on markets.45 Besides the challenge of 
physical availability, the main issue then relates to the level and stability of energy 
prices. Some authors prefer to avoid the term of ‘policy’ when speaking about 
security of energy supplies as it has become a shared responsibility between govern-
                                                 
38 The traditional private energy companies: Exxon-Mobil, Chevron, BP, Royal Dutch Shell, 
ConocoPhilips and Total (only six after mergers and acquisitions).  
39 Aramco (Saudi Arabia), Gazprom (Russia), CNPC (China), NIOC (Iran), PDVSA (Venezuela), 
Petrobras (Brazil), and Petronas (Malaysia).  
40 Umbach, op.cit., p. 1232.  
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid. 
43 Aad Correljé and Coby van der Linde, “Energy supply security and geopolitics: A European 
Perspective”, Energy Policy, vol. 34, no. 5, 2006, p. 535.  
44 Ibid., p. 536.  
45 Sovacool, op.cit., pp. 6-7. Raphaël Metais 
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ments, firms  and customers.46 From that perspective, the primary responsibility to 
ensure that all economic actors have access to energy at stable and affordable 
prices rests in the first place on economic operators. 
Such developments are intrinsically linked to the promotion of liberalisation in the 
energy sector. The belief that free and transparent markets can best guarantee an 
optimal allocation of energy resources has guided the progressive liberalisation of 
energy markets worldwide. From that perspective, “free markets are the customers’ 
first line of defence”,47 as they are the best means to ensure stability of prices. For 
instance, well-functioning energy markets should allow the required investments in 
producing countries in order to secure future oil and gas production and deliveries.  
The economic approach to energy security and the subsequent liberalisation 
paradigm can be usefully depicted by the alternative ‘Markets and Liberalisation’ 
scenario proposed by Correljé and van der Linde.48 This storyline assumes that energy 
flows are regulated by the markets which are themselves framed by international 
institutions. 49  This vision corresponds quite precisely to the EU’s  market-based 
approach. However, it must be kept in mind that ‘perfect’ liberalisation of energy 
markets in an economic sense cannot be achieved due to the particularities of fossil 
energy sources.50 Particularly on the gas market, prices may not convey the correct 
signals to govern change in production patterns as the resource is non-renewable. 
Besides, gas markets are characterised by long time lags between investments and 
production; gas will have to originate from increasingly remote regions which are 
either immature  (not yet ready to be commercially exploited)  or/and poorly 
integrated into the markets due to political constraints.  
 
Modernity and post-modernity: what is at stake in the field of energy security? 
Robert Cooper proposes a division of the world into three categories: the pre-
modern, the modern,  and the post-modern world.51 As the question of Europe’s 
energy security chiefly concerns the modern and the post-modern world, the pre-
modern world will be set aside.  
                                                 
46 Legge and Egenhofer, op.cit., p. 3.  
47 Pierre Noël, “Time to Challenge the Myths of Energy Security”, Financial Times, 2008. 
48 Correljé and van der Linde, op.cit., p. 535.  
49 Ibid.  
50 Ole Gunnar Austvik, “EU Natural Gas Market Liberalization and Long-term Security-of-Supply 
and Demand”, in Gunnar Fermann (ed.), Political Economy of Energy in Europe,  Berliner 
Wissenschafts-Verlag, Berlin, 2009, p. 94. 
51 Cooper, op.cit. EU Diplomacy Papers 3/2013 
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According to Cooper, the modern world is characterised by the centrality of force 
and the readiness of nation  states to use it in order to defend their interests. 52 
Consequently, peace is achieved through a subtle balance of power whose stability 
is guaranteed by one or several hegemonic powers (if  they agree). Another 
important feature of the modern world is that it entails a clear-cut division between 
states’ domestic and foreign affairs. External interference in domestic affairs in any 
form is considered prohibited and the best security guarantee remains force. 
However, the international system has evolved and since the Second World War a 
new model of managing international relations has emerged, which Cooper calls 
‘post-modernity’.53 One of the best examples that illustrates the features of post-
modernity is the Treaty of Rome in 1957 which created the European Communities. 
The Treaty created a new legal framework in which Member States voluntarily shared 
sovereignty in an increasing number of fields. Thus, the main characteristic of post-
modernity is the commitment of states to engage in a process that blurs the dividing 
line between domestic affairs and foreign policy. 
In the energy sector, such a division between modern and post-modern international 
actors can be identified, particularly in the interdependent relationship between the 
EU and Russia. Understanding the modern specificities of Russia’s energy policy 
requires looking at the broader policy developments since the election of Vladimir 
Putin as president. As amply documented, the Russian government has made a 
strategic use of national resources in order to restore the country’s stature as a world 
power and also to erase the humiliating image left by the Yeltsin era of Russia as a 
country not far from deliquescence.54 The state authority has been restored in the 
name of national interests and the renationalisation of the Russian elites “took the 
form of de facto nationalisation of the energy sector”.55 Such a movement is visible 
with the 2006 law establishing a legal monopoly on gas exports for Gazprom.56 
Moreover, the Russian monopoly has developed a tendency to manage energy 
relations on a strict bilateral basis with Central Asian countries as well as with 
European companies, following a clear modern logic of agreements respecting the 
full sovereignty of the parties. Russia’s reluctance to develop a framework based on 
reciprocity for energy investments fits in the same logic. 
                                                 
52 Ibid., pp. 21-26.  
53 Ibid., pp. 26-37.  
54 Ivan Krastev, “Russia and the ‘Other Europe’”, Russia in Global Affairs, 17 November 2007. 
55 Ibid.  
56 Belyi, op.cit., p. 127.  Raphaël Metais 
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By contrast, the EU’s willingness to develop an open and multilateral framework 
based on cooperative reciprocity clearly relates to  a post-modern logic  as the 
internal market precisely deconstructs the modern logic of sovereignty. In an internal 
market, the separation between internal and external economic affairs is void as the 
same rules apply for all economic actors under the same jurisdiction. From this 
perspective, post-modernity relates to the supranational aspects of the EU’s internal 
energy market, such as the integration of Norway in the European Economic Area 
through  its EFTA membership, whereas modernity describes the field in which 
traditional international relations apply as in the case of Russia.57  
The contrast between a modern Russia and a post-modern Europe is, however, not 
completely clear-cut. On the one side, Russia joined the WTO with European support. 
On the other side, it is clear that the EU’s external policies are not neutral in terms of 
self-interests. Furthermore, the fact that energy has not yet become a complete EU 
competence shows that Member States want to retain some sovereignty in a sector 
considered strategic and that EU integration is still marked by islets of modernity. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to argue that what fundamentally matters here is not 
modern and post-modern differences regarding “what actually is, [but rather] what 
should be”.58 The EU’s choice of policy tools must be adapted to the reality of 
international energy relations in order to bring about substantial policy outcomes. As 
Cooper puts it:  
For the post-modern state there is [...] a difficulty. It needs to get used to the 
idea of double standards. Among themselves, the post-modern states operate 
on the basis of laws and cooperative security. But when dealing with more old-
fashion kind of states outside the postmodern limits, Europeans need to revert 
to the rougher methods of an earlier age –  force, pre-emptive attack, 
deception, whatever is necessary for those who still live in the nineteenth-
century world of every state for itself.59  
 
Following this recommendation, Europe should not seek to deal with energy 
producing countries such as Russia or the Middle East – so long as they fail to engage 
in post-modern practices – in the same way as it deals with Norway, which belongs 
to the post-modern world.  
 
 
                                                 
57 Dag Harald Claes, “EU Energy Security Between Internal Market and Foreign Policy”, in 
Fermann (ed.), Political Economy of Energy in Europe, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, Berlin, 
2009, p. 52. 
58 Mezhuev, op.cit.  
59 Cooper, op.cit., pp. 61-62.  EU Diplomacy Papers 3/2013 
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The EU’s energy market liberalisation paradigm 
The energy market liberalisation has been adopted as a method to regulate the EU 
internal market internally but also to serve as a tool for external energy policy.  
Richard Youngs underlines that within European circles it is traditionally assumed that 
the internal energy market is the basis for developing an effective external energy 
policy.60 European commitments as well as official documents61 and discourses tend 
to give credit to the ‘market and institutions’ rationale,  which  is based on the 
assumption of an increasing globalisation of the markets. 62 Therefore, the EU’s 
market-based philosophy should spread towards the EU’s energy partners in order to 
create a common regulatory space in which EU interests are best preserved. An 
open, norm-based approach building on a liberalised internal energy market is thus 
seen as the bedrock for a successful EU external energy security policy.  
With regard to external security of supply, one main argument for the internal energy 
market liberalisation relates to the way it would end the division of the European 
market into national segments. A  fully integrated market would be a strong 
guarantee for the external security of supply, as it would prevent foreign suppliers 
such as Gazprom from dividing Member States and establishing energy contracts on 
a bilateral basis with national companies.  
The scope for political interference undermining Europe’s energy security as a result 
of the imperfect market liberalisation can be exemplified by the Nord Stream gas 
pipeline project.63 The project, depicted by former Polish Minster for Foreign Affairs 
Sikorski as a new “Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact”,64 is intended to further supply Germany 
with Russian gas directly by the construction of an undersea pipeline in the Baltic 
Sea. However, given the extremely high costs of the undersea project compared 
with a land pipeline, it is possible to argue that it is because of the imperfectly 
liberalised energy environment that the Russian government is able to sideline 
historically unfriendly EU Member States such as the Baltic States and Poland. In a 
fully liberalised environment, the project would be unlikely as it would be very difficult 
                                                 
60  Richard Youngs, Energy Security, Europe’s New Foreign Policy Challenge, London, 
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for Nordstream-sourced imported gas to compete with gas transported by land-
based pipelines or LNG. 
Another argument for the liberalisation paradigm lies in the fact that a liberalised 
energy environment prevents companies such as Gazprom from having an 
overwhelming weight in downstream gas activities. Economic changes at the 
beginning of the 2000s, notably the increase of gas prices, have given Gazprom the 
necessary resources to develop an internationalisation strategy and conclude 
merger deals with European companies in Italy, the UK, Denmark, Germany, Austria, 
Spain, Bulgaria, Hungary and France. 65 These moves are not a threat as such. 
However, given that Russian political developments tend to make Gazprom more 
than a commercial player, liberalisation principles such as third party access66 have 
also a direct external dimension to the extent that they limit the downstream market 
power of the foreign supplier and thus strengthen security of supply. It is therefore 
argued that the liberalisation of the energy market is aimed at securing energy 
supplies by re-framing the relationship between external energy suppliers such as 
Gazprom and European monopolies, which needs to be broken up in order to avoid 
important bilateral deals and dominant positions.67 
On the other side of the energy supplier-consumer relationship, market liberalisation is 
also aimed at allowing external suppliers to enter the downstream liberalised market 
in the form of spot contracts. The entrance of energy supply companies in the 
downstream market, where activities are generally more profitable than in the 
upstream market in a liberalised environment,68 is thus a guarantee that energy will 
flow to European consumers. In that sense, a liberalised energy market gets through 
the reconciliation of the imperative of security of energy supply with the commercial 
interest of foreign energy suppliers.  
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Market liberalisation and security of supply: a contraction in terms? 
 
Market liberalisation as a means to ensure energy security encounters two types of 
difficulties. The first kind  are of a  political nature,  whereas the second  kind, more 
intrinsic to the liberalisation phenomena, are of an economic nature.  
Political limits to liberalisation  
The pan-European energy market that the EU is promoting offers a good example of 
the political limits. The need for a wide energy market based on European norms and 
rules has been repeatedly mentioned in Commission documents. The 2010 
Communication,  for instance,  underlines the importance of “strengthening the 
external dimension of the EU energy market”69 through the implementation and the 
extension of the Energy Treaty Community, 70  whereas the 2006 Green Paper 
emphasises the need to “secure a rapid ratification by Russia of the Energy Charter 
Treaty [ECT] and [to conclude] the negotiations on the Transit Protocol”.71 
The ECT was signed in 1994 as the product of negotiations for a European Energy 
Charter, a non-binding political commitment aimed at East-West energy 
cooperation after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Replacing 1275 diverse bilateral 
agreements,72 it entered into force in 1998 and brought together former Soviet Union 
republics, Central and Eastern European countries (non-EU members at that time), 
the EU, Japan, Australia, Norway, and Turkey. 73 Its primary aim is to extend a 
GATT/WTO-inspired regulatory framework in the energy sector with a major emphasis 
on transit rules for energy networks.  
The main problem faced by the ECT is its non-ratification by Russia, which is 
particularly concerned with the ECT’s transit regime: signatories are obliged to 
facilitate the gas transit on a non-discriminatory basis, which would reduce Russia’s 
ability to resort to political considerations while selling gas. By refusing to be bound by 
the ECT provisions, Russia retains the power to conclude a network of bilateral transit 
arrangements, providing it with a de facto quasi-monopoly of energy supply for EU 
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gas imports.74 It must be mentioned, however, that Russia provisionally applies the 
ECT rules as long as the provisions do not contradict its own constitution or internal 
legislation.75 
Economic limits to liberalisation 
The first difficulty relates to long-term gas contracts. These energy contracts between 
foreign producing companies and European retailers or distributors have a negative 
effect from a competition point of view, as they prevent any third company from 
entering the gas market. Concluded for 20 to 30 years, the European Commission 
considers them to be an obstacle to a competitive and efficient gas market as they 
represent vertical foreclosure  (anti-competitive behaviour that appears when a 
company controls the supply and the retail of raw materials).76 These contracts are, 
however, necessary for a long-term security of gas supply. They allow for the required 
upstream investments in the producing country as well as stable prices for 
consumers. The main feature of these contracts is the take-or-pay clause, which links 
the producer and the buyer through a mutual guarantee. Under such clauses, the 
producer is committed to deliver an agreed amount of gas over a certain period of 
time, whereas the retailer is bound to pay for the agreed quantity. This way, the 
producer can engage the exploitation investments, as he knows they will be 
covered by the gas purchaser. On the other side, the buyer can count on access to 
supplies over a long period of time at a stable price. Therefore, without long-term 
contracts, the EU’s gas supply security could be put at risk as new infrastructures in 
producing countries would not be financed and the expected demand growth 
could not be met.77 
It must be underlined, however, that the academic community is divided on this 
question. Whereas some scholars argue, in line with the Commission, that liberalisa-
tion and the suppression of long-term contracts would not undermine energy 
security, some defend the idea that liberalisation puts energy security at risk by 
prohibiting long-term contracts.78 
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A second contentious point regarding the compatibility of energy market 
liberalisation with the security of supply relates to the question of asymmetrical 
access to energy markets and the principle of reciprocity. The EU has tried to expand 
its structural reforms of the energy market based on the principle of openness in the 
form of the ECT, which represents “the most inclusive international legal regime for 
the investment in the energy sector by creating protection mechanisms for energy 
investments”.79 European energy companies, however, have difficulties in profiting 
from such principles in Russia,  where legislation has been used to restrict foreign 
access to the energy sector. In particular, the Duma voted in 2006 a law establishing 
a monopoly on gas exports, which contradicts ECT principles.80 
In this context, the imbalance between the EU’s openness to foreign companies and 
the relative restriction of European access to Russian upstream markets has been 
deemed critical for energy supplies. A paradoxical response to such a situation 
would be the creation of a strong European gas monopoly able to uphold its side in 
the wrestling with Gazprom. 81  Such a solution would obviously disregard the 
liberalisa-tion principle, but reveals the structural problem caused by the liberalisation 
of the internal energy market in conjunction with security of energy supply 
objectives. It also poses the question of the relevance of the instruments put in place 
by the EU to mitigate energy security risks. 
 
Changing energy markets and challenges to a reinvigorated geopolitical 
approach 
The  changing structure of international energy markets, whereby liberal market 
mechanism are subject to growing political interference from energy producers, 
requires  the EU to  formulate  a credible geopolitical approach. This approach, 
however, faces important challenges.  
The changing structure of international energy markets 
The  international energy markets in the 1980s and 1990s were characterised by 
excess supply and excess capacities as a consequence of economic and energy 
policies that occurred in Europe after the oil shocks of the 1970s and the subsequent 
oil price increase which led to a diversification of energy sources in coal and nuclear 
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power.82 It is in that context that the liberalisation process started, first in the US and 
the UK and then at the European level. However, around the years 2000s, energy 
markets underwent a profound shift,  which made previous policy instruments not 
suitable anymore. Today, the concentration of resources in a few unstable places 
highlights the EU’s vulnerability; it has been calculated that 70% of the world’s gas 
resources are located in medium and high risk zones. 83 Another important issue 
relates to ownership access for international oil companies (IOCs) and the behaviour 
of producing countries.84 
The well-known cases of resource nationalism in Venezuela,  Bolivia,  and Russia85 
illustrate a general trend towards an increased control by governments over natural 
resources in energy-producing countries. Currently only 10% of the world gas 
resources can be managed by IOCs on the basis of equity access. 86 The 90% 
remaining are found in countries where governments actively participate in the 
energy sector through nationally owned companies (NOCs). As such, this situation is 
not  necessarily  problematic,  given that IOCs and NOCs could have mutually 
beneficial interests: producing countries could exchange the access to subsoil and 
resources against skills and technology that the NOCs generally lack. Such 
partnerships are,  however,  not always possible, for instance when producing 
governments use energy in a broader domestic  policy framework,  such as the 
recourse to energy subsidies in Russia to satisfy increased national demand at the 
expense of exported volumes.87 Fundamentally, however, the relationship between 
IOCs and NOCs is dependent on their relative bargaining power. Energy prices play 
a central role in that regard. Whereas low prices in the 1980s and 1990s tipped the 
balance in favour of Western companies, current high energy prices (gas prices 
follow the oil price trends as they are fixed according to a formula that includes oil 
prices) give a strong advantage to NOCs. High energy prices have, for example, 
strengthened Russia’s ability to adopt a bold political stance in the face of its 
European customers. 
                                                 
82 Dieter Helm, The New Energy Paradigm, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 3.  
83 Abdelkader Rainaldo Spanjer, Structural and Regulatory Reform of the European Natural 
Gas Market, Leiden, University of Leiden, 2008, p. 37.  
84 It is assumed here that increased access to  resources for Western IOCs lowers energy 
security risks. 
85 In Russia, when Gazprom took majority interests in Shakalin II and Kovykta from Royal Dutch 
Shell, the sales were considered “forced nationalizations”. See A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, “The 
Issue of Resource Nationalism: Risk Engineering and Resource Management in the Oil and 
Gas Industry”, Texas Journal of Oil, Gas and Energy Law, vol. 5, no. 1, 2009, p. 85.  
86 Spanjer, op.cit., p. 39.  
87 Ibid., p. 40. EU Diplomacy Papers 3/2013 
  21 
Put simply, the 2000s have witnessed the emergence of a fourth period88 in the 
consumer-producer energy relationship, which “is characterized by a state-driven 
approach rather than a market-driven one and demonstrates a structural change 
from a buyers’ to a sellers’ market”.89 The political answer required from the EU is, 
however, facing important challenges.  
Challenges to a reinvigorated geopolitical approach 
The ability of the EU to be a global and influential energy player rests on two main 
determinants: its political will to engage in a collective external energy policy and its 
institutional capacity to support such a move.90 A clear geopolitical dimension to the 
EU’s nascent energy policy was called upon in the Commission’s 2006 Green Paper, 
which identified the challenges confronting an effective external European energy 
policy.91 The Green Paper proposed “clearly identified priorities for the upgrading 
and construction of new infrastructure necessary for the security of EU energy 
supplies”92 and the development of “independent gas pipeline supplies from the 
Caspian region, North Africa and the Middle East into the heart of the EU”93 in order 
to diversify energy sources and ensure security of supply. 
The first main challenge in this regard relates to the EU’s institutional capacity to 
develop a coherent external policy. The institutional capacity is of utmost 
importance to develop an effective energy diplomacy. For example, individual 
Member States can conduct their external energy relations effectively, as they have 
full sovereignty and a functioning and coherent diplomatic apparatus for that 
purpose. When they engage into bilateral energy relations, for example Germany 
with Russia, or France with Algeria, they do it in a ‘modern’ framework, based on the 
mutual recognition of sovereignty. The EU, to the contrary, is unable to develop the 
same type or relations due to its weak integration in the field of external energy 
policy.94 While the EU represents a quite integrated energy community internally, its 
Member States merely coordinate their external energy policies. The biggest 
challenge for the EU  and its Member States  from an institutional capacity 
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perspective is therefore to proceed towards further integration to develop a full EU 
competence  on energy policy that can be used externally to engage energy 
partners with ‘modern’ methods.  
Linked to the above-mentioned institutional challenge is the question of a shared 
political will to address external energy partners in the same fashion. The relationship 
between EU Members States and Russia shows that discrepancies between various 
national interests make this unlikely to happen anytime soon. A classification of EU 
Member States according to their national foreign policy towards Russia and their 
subsequent positions in EU negotiations when dealing with Russia helps understand 
this point.95 First, Greece and Cyprus can be seen as ‘Trojan horses’ for Russian 
interests in the EU, as the two countries have regularly adopted a pro-Russian stance 
in intra-EU discussions. Russia is an important partner for Greece in terms of energy 
and arms trade as well as diplomatic support on the Turkish issue, whereas Cyprus 
has become Russia’s biggest hub for offshore companies, which makes Cyprus in 
turn formally the first investor in Russia.96  
Second, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain can be depicted as ‘strategic partners’ 
for Russia. The importance of trade flows explains the bond with the first three 
countries, whereas the relation with Spain harbours potentials for the future. The third 
group of countries is called ‘friendly pragmatists’ and includes the bulk of EU Member 
States which tend to follow the initiatives of the strategic partners while not being 
strong supporters of Russian interests (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Portugal). Fourth, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom correspond to the category of ‘frosty pragmatists’: while business-
oriented towards Russia, they show particular sensitivity to human rights as well as 
diplomatic code violations. Fifth, Poland and Lithuania represent the ‘new Cold 
Warriors’. These countries, in addition to being heavily dependent on Russian energy 
imports, are still profoundly marked by the past and their painful relations with the 
Soviet Union and regularly express deep concerns over Russia’s growing power in 
Europe’s neighbourhood.  
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Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to answer the following questions: first, to what extent does 
the liberalisation of the EU’s internal energy market contribute to Europe’s energy 
security? Second, what other policy options besides the market-based approach 
does the EU have to secure its energy supplies? 
The analysis of the liberalisation paradigm has shown that it remains a useful tool to 
ensure energy security. A liberalised internal gas market is,  for instance,  a strong 
guarantee against the attempts by Russia to divide the Europeans which might lead 
to the exclusion of some Member States from Russian gas. One important weakness 
of this paradigm is, however, that it can hardly be applied to the EU’s partners, which 
limits the EU’s ability to secure its energy supplies.  
With regard to the ineffective partners that do not abide by the ‘post-modern’ rules 
of the game, the EU’s market-based approach needs to be complemented by a 
geopolitical approach, whereby the EU would rely on instruments of the ‘modern’ 
words such as pressure, threat and sanctions. This claim is supported by the changing 
structure of international energy markets and the shift from a buyers’ to a sellers’ 
market and by the increasing involvement of politics in the management of energy 
by producing countries.  
The advent of such a double-standard approach,  however,  still faces important 
challenges. The Member States remain  divided by different  economic and 
geopolitical interests and the EU has not yet been given enough competences to 
implement such a double-standard approach. The EU is therefore an international 
energy actor in the making. Although the internal energy market can be seen as a 
convergence of interests among Member States, this integration still does not provide 
a sufficient basis to clinch a parallel movement on external energy policy aspects.  
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